Download Crusader Castles In The Holy Land 1192-1302 by David Nicolle PDF

By David Nicolle

The debacle of the second one campaign in 1148 prompted the Crusader States to understand the need of constructing a extra wary procedure. the unique expansionist spirit mostly disappeared, and the Crusader States made priorities of strengthening their latest fortifications and cities and development new castles. those buildings encompassed center elements of Western ecu army structure with the mixing of speedily constructing Arab and Islamic traditions. Following castle 21: 'Crusader Castles within the Holy Land 1097â€"1192', this publication examines the layout, improvement and protecting ideas of a few of the best-known Crusader fortifications and castles, together with Crac des Chevaliers, Castel Blanc, Arsuf, Margat, Atlit, Montfort and Acre.

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Sadat had no doubt about who was the senior and who was the junior partner in this alliance, though Assad believed that it was an equal partnership. Assad was particularly vexed by the loss of the Golan Heights: it was a dishonor to have an Israeli presence on Syrian territory, the retention of which by Israel was absolutely untenable. This status quo had to be reversed. Indeed, Israel’s very existence was anathema to Assad. Israel’s territorial pressure interfered with Assad’s aspiration to control or unite all of the lands contiguous to Syria.

For Begin, Judea and Samaria were not occupied lands; they were liberated territories. He adamantly rejected any territorial compromise that included the return of Arab sovereignty to the West Bank, which he referred to by the biblically derived geographic names of Judea and Samaria. Retaining Judea and Samaria was not some sophisticated negotiating ploy; it was not an opening position in discussions; Judea and Samaria simply were not on the negotiating agenda. Retaining Judea and Samaria was his closing position; they were the heart of the biblical land of Israel; they were part of its fiber.

He did not want the more complicated issue of the West Bank’s future or the uncertainty and fractious nature of the JordanianPalestinian relationship intruding into his plans for an Egyptian-centered postwar diplomacy and reasoned that if Jordan joined the war in a full-fledged fashion, it would be centrally involved in postwar diplomacy. The Jordanians denied the request. Independent of their discussions, Jordanian leadership reasoned that, in the event of war, Amman could not afford to be dragged in like it had been in the June 1967 War.

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